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Abstract
Approaches to decision-making under uncertainty in the belief func-
tion framework are reviewed. Most methods are shown to blend criteria
for decision under ignorance with the maximum expected utility princi-
ple of Bayesian decision theory. A distinction is made between methods
that construct a complete preference relation among acts, and those that
allow incomparability of some acts due to lack of information. Meth-
ods developed in the imprecise probability framework are applicable in
the Dempster-Shafer context and are also reviewed. Shafer’s constructive
decision theory, which substitutes the notion of goal for that of utility,
is described and contrasted with other approaches. The paper ends by
pointing out the need to carry out deeper investigation of fundamental
issues related to decision-making with belief functions and to assess the
descriptive, normative and prescriptive values of the different approaches.
Keywords:Dempster-Shafer theory, evidence theory, decision under un-
certainty.
1 Introduction
The idea of using completely monotone capacities, or belief functions, to model
uncertainty dates back to Dempster’s seminal work on statistical inference [6,
7, 8]. It was later elaborated by Shafer in his 1976 book [31, 35], to become a
full-fledged theory of uncertainty, now commonly referred to as Dempster-Shafer
(DS) theory, evidence theory, or theory of belief functions [12]. In short, DS
theory starts with the definition of a frame of discernment Ω containing all the
possible values some variable X can take. One and only one element of Ω is the
true value. Independent pieces by evidence about X are then represented by
belief functions and combined using a suitable operator called Dempster’s rule
of combination.
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Much of the appeal of this theory is due to the generality of the belief func-
tion framework. If Bel is additive, it is a probability measure, and the usual
probabilistic formalism if recovered. If there is some subset A of Ω such that
Bel(B) = 1 if B contains A and Bel(B) = 0 otherwise, then belief function
Bel represents a state of knowledge in which we know for sure that the truth
is in A, and nothing else. In particular, the case A = Ω corresponds to com-
plete ignorance or lack of evidence. Belief functions thus allow us to represent
logical information, probabilistic information, or any combination of both. In
that sense, belief functions can be seen both as generalized sets [13], and as
generalized probability measures.
Whereas Shafer’s book presented in great detail the mathematics of belief
functions in the finite setting as well as mechanisms for combining belief func-
tions, possibly expressed in different frames, it remained silent on the important
issue of decision-making. Shafer wrote a paper on this topic in the early 1980’s
[35], but this paper remained unpublished until recently [34]. In the last 40
years, many researchers have attempted to fill this vacuum and propose meth-
ods for making decisions when uncertainty is described by belief functions. The
objective of this review paper is to provide a broad picture of these endeavors in
view of clarifying the main issues and indicating directions for further research.
As belief functions make it possible to represent both ignorance and proba-
bilistic information, most approaches to decision-making using belief functions
extend classical methods for making decision under ignorance or probabilistic
uncertainty. We will thus start with a brief reminder of these classical methods
in Section 2, after which the belief function framework will be recalled in Section
3. We will then proceed with a systematic exposition of decision methods in
the belief function framework. Criteria for decision-making with belief functions
directly extending the classical criteria will first be reviewed in Section 4, and
approaches based on the imprecise-probability view of belief functions will be
described in Section 5. Shafer’s “constructive” decision theory [34], in which
the concept of “goal” replaces that of “utility” will be exposed in Section 6.
Finally, the different approaches will be summarized and discussed in Section 7.
2 Classical Decision Theories
In this section, we will first introduce the formal setting as well as the main
notations and definitions in Section 2.1. The two classical frameworks of deci-
sion under ignorance and decision under probabilistic uncertainty will then be
recalled, respectively, in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
2.1 Definitions and Notations
A decision problem can be seen as a situation in which a decision-maker (DM)
has to choose a course of action (or act) in some set F = {f1, . . . , fn}. An act
may have different consequences, depending on the state of nature. Denoting
by Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωs} the set of states of nature and by C = {c1, . . . , cr} the set
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Table 1: Payoff matrix for the investment example.
uij ω1 ω2 ω3
f1 37 25 23
f2 49 70 2
f3 4 96 1
f4 22 76 25
f5 35 20 23
of consequences (or outcomes), an act can thus be formalized as a mapping f
from Ω to C. In this paper, the three sets Ω, C and F will be assumed to be
finite.
It is often assumed that the desirability of the consequences can be modeled
by a quantitative utility function u : C → R, which assigns a numerical value to
each consequence. The higher this value, the more desirable is the consequence
for the DM. Utilities can be elicited directly, or then can sometimes be deduced
from the observation of the DM’s preferences under uncertainty [48, 29]. If the
acts are indexed by i and the states of nature by j, we will denote by cij = fi(ωj)
the consequence of selecting act fi if state ωj occurs, and by uij = u(cij) the
corresponding utility. The n × s matrix U = (uij) will be called a payoff or
utility matrix. These notions will now be illustrated using the following example
inspired from [25].
Example 1 Assume that the DM wants to invest money in stocks of some
company. The acts then correspond to the stocks of the different companies.
We assume that the DM considers five different stocks in F = {f1, . . . , f5}. The
states of nature correspond to different economic scenarios that might occur
and which would influence the payoffs of the stocks of the different companies.
Suppose that the DM considers three scenarios collected in Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}.
The payoff matrix is shown in Table 1.
If the true state of nature ω were known, then the desirability of an act f
could be deduced from that of its consequence f(ω). Typically, however, the
state of nature is unknown. A decision problem is then described by (1) the
payoff matrix U and (2) some description of the uncertainty about the state of
nature. The outcome of the decision problem is typically a preference relation
< among acts. This relation is interpreted as follows: given two acts f and f ′,
f < f ′ means that f is found by the DM to be at least as desirable as f ′. We
also define the strict preference relation as f  f ′ iff f < f ′ and ¬(f ′ < f)
(meaning that f is strictly more desirable than f ′) and an indifference relation
f ∼ f ′ iff f < f ′ and f ′ < f (meaning that f and f ′ are equally desirable).
The preference relation is generally assumed to be reflexive (for any f , f < f)
and transitive (for any f, f ′, f ′′, if f < f ′ and f ′ < f ′′, then f < f ′′): it is then
a preorder. If, additionally, the relation is antisymmetric (for any f, f ′, if f < f ′
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and f ′ < f , then f = f ′), then it is an order. This preference relation is complete
if, for any two acts f and f ′, f < f ′ or f ′ < f . Otherwise, it is partial. An act
f is a greatest element of relation < if it is at least as desirable as any other
act, i.e, if, for any f ′ ∈ F , f < f ′. A complete preorder always has at least
one greatest element, and it has only one if it is a complete order. An act f
is a maximal (or non-dominated) element of the strict preference relation if no
other act is strictly preferred to f , i.e., if for any f ′ ∈ F , ¬(f ′  f). A greatest
element is a maximal element, but the converse is false in general.
Most decision methods provide a complete or partial preorder of the set F
of acts. We can then compute the set of greatest elements in the former case,
and the set of maximal elements in the latter. Some methods do not give us a
preference relation, but directly a choice set, defined as subset F∗ ⊆ F composed
of “most preferred” acts. We can then reconstruct a partial preference relation
such that all elements in F∗ are greatest elements as follows:
∀f, f ′ ∈ F∗, f ∼ f ′
∀f ∈ F∗,∀f ′ 6∈ F∗, f  f ′.
2.2 Decision under Ignorance
Let us start with the situation where the DM is totally ignorant of the state of
nature. All the information given to the DM is thus the utility matrix U . A act
fi is said to be dominated by fk if the consequences of act fk are always at least
as desirable as those of act fi, whatever the state of nature, and strictly more
desirable in at least one state, i.e., if uij ≤ ukj for all j, and uij < ukj for some
j. According to the non-domination principle [44], an act that is dominated
by another one should never be chosen and can, therefore, be discarded. For
instance, in Table 1, we can see that act f5 is dominated by f1: consequently,
we can remove f5 from further consideration.
After all dominated acts have been removed, there remains the problem of
ordering the non-dominated acts by desirability, and finding the set of most
desirable acts. In the following, we first recall some classical decision methods
in this setting, as well as a more recent generalization. We then discuss some
axiomatic arguments proposed by Arrow and Hurwicz [2].
Classical Criteria
Several criteria of “rational choice” that have been proposed to derive a complete
preference relation over acts. They are summarized in the following list (see,
e.g., [27, 44]):
• The maximax criterion considers, for each act, its more favorable conse-
quence. We then have fi < fk iff
max
j
uij ≥ max
j
ukj . (1)
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• Conversely, Wald’s maximin criterion [51] takes into account the least
favorable consequence of each act: act fi is thus at least as desirable as
fk iff
min
j
uij ≥ min
j
ukj . (2)
• The Hurwicz criterion [21] considers, for each act, a convex combination
of the minimum and maximum utility: fi < fk iff
αmin
j
uij + (1− α) max
j
uij ≥ αmin
j
ukj + (1− α) max
j
ukj , (3)
where α is a parameter in [0, 1] called the pessimism index.
• The Laplace criterion ranks acts according to the average utility of their
consequences: fi < fk iff
1
s
s∑
j=1
uij ≥ 1
s
s∑
j=1
ukj . (4)
• Finally, the minimax regret criterion [28] considers an act fi to be at least
as desirable as fk if it has smaller maximal regret, where regret is defined
as the utility difference with the best act, for a given state of nature. More
precisely, let the regret rij for act fi and state ωj be defined as follows,
rij = max
`
u`j − uij . (5)
The maximum regret for act fi is Ri = maxj rij , and act fi is considered
to be at least as desirable as fk when Ri ≤ Rk.
Example 2 Consider the payoff matrix of Example 1. We have seen that act
f5 is dominated and should be ruled out. From the calculations shown in Tables
2 and 3, we can see that the above five criteria yield different strict preference
relations:
• Maximin: f1  f4  f2  f3
• Maximax: f3  f4  f2  f1
• Hurwicz with α = 0.5: f4  f3  f2  f1
• Laplace: f4  f2  f3  f1
• Minimax regret: f2  f4  f3  f1
The maximax and maximin criteria correspond, respectively, to extreme
optimistic and pessimistic (or conservative) attitudes of the DM. The Hurwicz
criterion allows us to parameterize the DM’s attitude toward ambiguity, using
the pessimism index. Figure 1(a) shows the aggregated utilities as functions of
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Table 2: Calculation of the preference relations for the maximin, maximax,
Hurwicz (α = 0.5) and Laplace criteria with the payoff matrix of Example 1.
ui1 ui2 ui3 minj uij maxj uij 0.5(minj uij + maxj uij)
1
s
∑
j uij
f1 37 25 23 23 37 30 28.3
f2 49 70 2 2 70 36 40.3
f3 4 96 1 1 96 48.5 33.7
f4 22 76 25 22 76 49 41
Table 3: Calculation of the preference relation for the max regret criterion with
the payoff matrix of Example 1.
ui1 ui2 ui3 ri1 ri2 ri3 maxj rij
f1 37 25 23 12 71 2 71
f2 49 70 2 0 26 23 26
f3 4 96 1 45 0 24 45
f4 22 76 25 27 20 0 27
the pessimism index. The Laplace criterion can be seen as an application of the
expected utility principle (see Section 2.3 below), using a uniform probability
distribution over the state of nature as an application of Laplace’s principle
of indifference. These four criteria amount to extending the utility function
to sets, i.e., they aggregate, for each act fi, the utilities uij for all j, into a
single number. The minimax regret criterion works differently, as it measures
the desirability of an act by a quantity that depends on the consequences of all
other acts.
Ordered Weighted Average Criterion
The Laplace, maximax, maximin and Hurwicz criteria correspond to different
ways of aggregating utilities using, respectively, the average, the maximum, the
minimum, and a convex sum of the minimum and the maximum. These four
operators happen to belong to the family of so-called Ordered Weighted Average
(OWA) operators [58]. An OWA operator of arity s is a function F : Rs → R
of the form
F (x1, . . . , xs) =
s∑
i=1
wix(i), (6)
where x(i) is the i-th largest element in the collection x1, . . . , xs, and w1, . . . , ws
are positive weights that sum to 1. It is clear that the four above-mentioned
operators are obtained for different choices of the weights:
Average: (1/s, 1/s, . . . , 1/s);
Maximum: (1, 0, . . . , 0);
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Table 4: Aggregated utilities using the OWA aggregation operator with β = 0.2
and β = 0.7 and the payoff matrix of Example 1.
ui1 ui2 ui3 F0.2(ui1, ui2, ui3) F0.7(ui1, ui2, ui3)
f1 37 25 23 24.62 31.34
f2 49 70 2 18.67 53.40
f3 4 96 1 9.49 54.50
f4 22 76 25 27.13 52.79
Minimum: (0, . . . , 0, 1);
Hurwicz: (1− α, 0, . . . , 0, α).
In a decision-making context, each weight wi may be interpreted as a probability
that the i-th best outcome will happen. Yager [58] defines the degree of optimism
of an OWA operator with weight vector w as
OPT (w) =
s∑
i=1
s− i
s− 1wi. (7)
The degree of optimism equals 1 for the maximum, 0 for the minimum, 0.5 for
the mean, and 1 − α for the Hurwicz criterion. Given a degree of optimism β,
Yager [58] proposes to choose the OWA operator Fβ that maximizes the entropy
ENT (w) = −
s∑
i=1
wi logwi, (8)
under the constraint OPT (w) = β.
Example 3 Consider again the data of Example 1. With β = 0.2 and β = 0.7,
we get, respectively, w = (0.0819, 0.236, 0.682) and w = (0.554, 0.292, 0.154).
The aggregating utilities for these two cases are shown in Table 4, and the cor-
responding preference relations are:
• β = 0.2: f4  f1  f2  f3
• β = 0.7: f3  f2  f4  f1.
Figure 1(b) shows the aggregated utilities for each of the four acts, as functions
of β. Comparing Figures 1(a) and 1(b), we can see that the Hurwicz and OWA
criteria yield similar results. However, the OWA parametrization allows us to
recover the Laplace criterion for β = 0.5.
Axiomatic Arguments
The fact that different criteria yield different (and, sometimes, even opposite)
results is disturbing and it calls for axiomatic arguments to support the choice
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Figure 1: Aggregated utilities vs. pessimism index α for the Hurwicz criterion
(a) and vs. one minus the degree of optimism β for the OWA criterion (b).
(Example 3).
of a criterion. Given a set of acts F , each of the above five criteria induces a
complete preorder < and a choice set F∗ containing the greatest elements of
<. Arrow and Hurwicz [2] have proposed four axioms that a choice operator
F → F∗ (i.e., a way of constructing the choice set) should verify. The following
description of these axioms is taken from [16].
Axiom A1: The non-empty intersection of a decision problem (set of acts) and
the choice set of a larger decision problem is the choice set of the former.
Formally, if F1 ⊂ F2 and F∗2 ∩ F1 6= ∅, then F∗1 = F∗2 ∩ F1.
Axiom A2: Relabeling actions and states does not change the optimal status
of actions. Formally, if φa is a one-to-one mapping from F1 to F2 and φs
is a one-to-one mapping from Ω1 to Ω2 such that, for all f ∈ F1 and for
all ω ∈ Ω1, f(ω) = φa(f)(φs(ω)), then f ∈ F∗1 iff φa(f) ∈ F∗2 .
Given a set of acts F , a state ω ∈ Ω is said to be duplicate if there exists another
state ω′ in Ω such that, for all f ∈ F , f(ω) = f(ω′). Deleting a duplicate state
ω means defining a new state space Ω′ = Ω\{ω} and the new set of actions F|Ω′
containing the restrictions f |Ω′ of all acts f in F . We then have the following
postulate.
Axiom A3: Deletion of a duplicate state does not change the optimality status
of actions. Formally, f ∈ F∗ iff f |Ω′ ∈ (F|Ω′)∗.
Axiom A4 (dominance): If f ∈ F∗ and f ′ dominates f , then f ′ ∈ F∗. If
f 6∈ F∗ and f dominates f ′, then f ′ 6∈ F∗.
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Axiom A1 is clearly violated by the minimax regret criterion. To see this,
consider again, for instance, the decision problem of Example 1. For F1 =
{f1, f2, f3, f4}, we have seen that F∗1 = {f2} according to the minimax regret
criterion. Now, consider a new act f6 such that u61 = 0, u62 = 100 and u63 = 0,
and F2 = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f6}. As a consequence of the introduction of this new
act, the maximal regrets of f1, f2, f3, f4 and f6 now become, respectively,
75, 30, 45, 27 and 49. Hence, F∗2 = {f4} and F∗1 6= F∗2 ∩ F1. Act f4, which
was initially considered strictly less desirable than f2, becomes strictly more
desirable after an additional act f6 is considered.
It is also easy to see that Axiom A3 is violated by the Laplace criterion. To
illustrate this point, assume that, in Example 1, we split the state of nature
ω1 in two states: “Economic scenario 1 occurs and there is life on Mars” (ω
′
1)
and “Economic scenario 1 occurs and there is no life on Mars” (ω′′1 ). It is clear
that the payoffs of the real estate investments are identical under ω′1 and ω
′′
1 .
Consequently, the new payoff matrix will be obtained by duplicating the first
column in Table 1. With this payoff matrix, the average utilities for the four
acts are 30.5, 42.5, 26.25 and 36.25. Consequently, the choice set for the Laplace
criterion is F∗ = {f2}. Should we learn that there is no life of Mars, we would
delete ω′1 and get that same payoff matrix as in Table 1, resulting in choice set
{f4}. Learning that there is no life on Mars thus made us change our investment
decision!
Consequently, convincing arguments can be put forward for rejecting the La-
place and minimax regret criteria as criteria for rational decision-making under
ignorance. A stronger result, due to Arrow and Hurwicz [2] is that, under some
regularity assumptions, Axioms A1 to A4 imply that the choice set depends
only on the worst and the best consequences of each act. This result provides a
strong argument in favor of the Hurwicz criterion (3).
2.3 Decision under Probabilistic Uncertainty
Let us now consider the situation where uncertainty about the state of nature
is quantified by probabilities p1, . . . , ps on Ω. Typically, these probabilities are
assumed to be objective: we say that we have a problem of decision under
risk. However, the following developments also apply to the case where the
probabilities are subjective. In any case, the probability distribution p1, . . . , ps
is assumed to be known, together with the utility matrix U . We can then
compute, for each act fi, its expected utility as
EU(fi) =
s∑
j=1
uijpj . (9)
According to the Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) principle, an act fi is more
desirable than an act fk if its yields more desirable consequences on average over
all possible states of nature, i.e., if it has a higher expected utility: fi < fk iff
EU(fi) ≥ EU(fk).
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The MEU principle was first axiomatized by von Neumann and Morgenstern
[48]. We give hereafter a summary of their argument. Given a probability
distribution on Ω, an act f : Ω → C induces a probability measure P on the
set C of consequences (assumed to be finite), called a lottery. We denote by L
the set of lotteries on C. If we agree that two acts providing the same lottery
are equivalent, then the problem of comparing the desirability of acts becomes
that of comparing the desirability of lotteries. Let < be a preference relation
among lotteries. Von Neumann and Morgenstern argued that, to be rational, a
preference relation should verify the following three axioms.
Complete preorder: the preference relation is a complete and non-trivial pre-
order (i.e., it is a reflexive, transitive and complete relation) on L.
Continuity: for any lotteries P , Q and R such that P  Q  R, there exist
probabilities α and β in [0, 1] such that
αP + (1− α)R  Q  βP + (1− β)R, (10)
where αP + (1−α)R is a compound lottery, which refers to the situation
where you receive P with probability α and Q with probability 1 − α.
This axiom means that (1) no lottery R is so undesirable that it cannot
become desirable if mixed with some very desirable lottery P , and (2) that,
conversely, no act P is so desirable that it cannot become undesirable if
mixed with some very undesirable lottery R.
Independence: for any lotteries P , Q and R and for any α ∈ (0, 1],
P < Q⇔ αP + (1− α)R < αQ+ (1− α)R. (11)
We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Von Neumann and Morgentern) The two following proposi-
tions are equivalent:
1. The preference relation  verifies the axioms of complete preorder, conti-
nuity, and independence;
2. There exists a utility function u : C → R such that, for any two lotteries
P = (p1, . . . , pr) and Q = (q1, . . . , qr),
P  Q⇔
r∑
i=1
piu(ci) ≥
r∑
i=1
qiu(ci). (12)
Function u is unique up to a strictly increasing affine transformation.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theorem has had a tremendous impact,
as it provides a compelling justification of both the notion of utility, and the
MEU principle. For problems of decision under risk, the normative value of
10
the MEU principle is widely accepted. From a descriptive point of view, vio-
lations of the MEU principle by most DMs in some particular situations have
been demonstrated experimentally by Allais [1], among others. For problems
of decision under uncertainty (in which probabilities are not given in advance),
Savage [29] has argued, based on rationality requirements, that a DM should
always maximize expected utility, for some subjective probability measure and
utility function. However, the relevance of Savage’s axioms has been questioned
(see, e.g., [33]). Moreover, it can be shown experimentally that, in the presence
of ambiguity, people tend to make decisions in a way that is not consistent with
the “sure thing principle”, one of Savage’s axioms [14].
3 Theory of Belief Functions
Before reviewing decision methods in the belief function framework in the fol-
lowing sections, we will first recall the main definitions and results pertaining to
belief functions in Section 3.1. The motivation for considering decision problems
in this framework will then be exposed in Section 3.2.
3.1 Belief Functions
Basic definitions As before, let Ω be the set of states of nature. A mass
function [31] is a mapping m from the power set of Ω, denoted by 2Ω, to [0, 1],
such that ∑
A⊆Ω
m(A) = 1,
and m(∅) = 0. Any subset A of Ω such that m(A) > 0 is called a focal set
of m. In Dempster-Shafer theory, m is used as a representation of a piece of
evidence about some variable X taking values in Ω. Such a function arises
when we compare the evidence to the situation in which we receive a coded
message [32], and we know that the code has been selected at random from a
set S = {s1, . . . , sq} with known probabilities p1, . . . , pq. If code si was selected,
then the meaning of the message isX ∈ Γ(si), where Γ is a multi-valued mapping
from S to 2Ω. In this setting,
m(A) =
∑
{i|Γ(si)=A}
pi
is the probability that the meaning of the code is X ∈ A, i.e., the probability of
knowing only that X ∈ A, and nothing more.
Given a mass function m, belief and plausibility functions can be defined,
respectively, as
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B)
and
Pl(A) =
∑
B∩A6=∅
m(B) = 1−Bel(A),
11
where A denotes the complement of A. The quantities Bel(A) and Pl(A) de-
note, respectively, the probability that the evidence implies the proposition
X ∈ A, and the probability that the evidence does not contradict this propo-
sition. Mathematically, a belief function is a completely monotone capacity,
i.e., it verifies Bel(∅) = 0, Bel(Ω) = 1 and, for any k ≥ 2 and for any family
A1, . . . , Ak of subsets of Ω,
Bel
 k⋃
i=1
Ai
 ≥ ∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,k}
(−1)|I|+1Bel
⋂
i∈I
Ai
 .
Conversely, any completely monotone capacity Bel corresponds a unique mass
function m such that
m(A) =
∑
∅6=B⊆A
(−1)|A|−|B|Bel(B),
for all A ⊆ Ω.
Relationship with probabilistic and set-theoretic formalisms When
the focal sets of m are singletons, functions Bel and Pl boil down to a single
probability measure. Mass function m is then said to be Bayesian. Dempster-
Shafer theory is, thus, strictly more expressive than probability theory, which
is recovered as a special case when the available information is uncertain, but
precise. When there is only one focal set A, then Bel(B) = I(A ⊆ B), where
I(·) is the indicator function. Such a belief function is said to be logical. It
describes to a piece of evidence that tell us that X ∈ A for sure, and nothing
more: it thus describes certain, but imprecise information. There is a one-to-one
correspondence between subsets and Ω and logical belief functions. A general
belief function (or, equivalently, its associated mass function) can, thus, be seen
as a generalized set [13].
Imprecise-probability view Given a belief function Bel induced by a mass
function m, we can consider the set P(m) of probability measures P that dom-
inate it, i.e., such that P (A) ≥ Bel(A) for all A ⊆ Ω. Any such probability
measure is said to be compatible with Bel, and P(m) is called the credal set
of m. It is clear that this set is convex. An arbitrary element of P(m) can
be obtained by distributing each mass m(A) among the elements of A. More
precisely, let us call an allocation of m any function
a : Ω× (2Ω \ {∅})→ [0, 1] (13)
such that, for all A ⊆ Ω, ∑
ω∈A
a(ω,A) = m(A). (14)
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Each quantity a(ω,A) can be viewed as a part of m(A) allocated to the element
ω of A. By summing up the numbers a(ω,A) for each ω, we get a probability
mass function on Ω,
pa(ω) =
∑
A3ω
a(ω,A). (15)
It can be shown [6] that the set of probability measures constructed in that way
is exactly equal to the credal set P(m). Furthermore, the following equalities
hold for any A ⊆ Ω:
Bel(A) = min
P∈P(m)
P (A)
Pl(A) = max
P∈P(m)
P (A).
A belief function is, thus, a coherent lower probability. However, not all coherent
lower probabilities are belief functions [53].
3.2 Necessity of a Theory of Decision-Making with Belief
Functions
As shown in the previous section, the formalism of belief functions, having
more degrees of freedom than probability theory, allows for the representation
of weaker forms of information, up to total ignorance. Belief functions thus
appear in decision problems when information is weaker than generally assumed
in the probabilistic framework. In particular, two non exclusive situations are
typically encountered.
The first situation is one in which the DM’s information concerning the
possible states of nature is best described by a belief function m on Ω. This
is the case, for instance, in classification problem, when a classifier quantifies
the uncertainty about the class of an object by a belief function, and a decision
regarding the assignment of that object has to be made [10]. Any act f then
carries m to the set C of consequences. The mass assigned to each focal set A
of m is transferred to f(A). The resulting mass function1 µf on C, called an
evidential lottery, is then defined by
µf (B) =
∑
{A⊆Ω|f(A)=B}
m(A), (16)
for any B ⊆ C.
The second situation in which belief functions come into the picture is that
in which the consequences of each act under each state of nature may not be
precisely described. As discussed in [15], this situation may arise when the de-
cision problem is underspecified: for instance, the set of acts F or the state
space Ω may be too coarsely defined. In that case, an act may formally be
1In the rest of this paper, we will denote mass functions on Ω by the letter m and mass
functions on C (evidential lotteries) by the Greek letter µ.
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represented by a multi-valued mapping f : Ω → 2C , assigning a set of pos-
sible consequences f(ω) ⊆ C to each state of nature ω. Given a probability
distribution p : Ω→ [0, 1], f then induces the following mass function µf on C,
µf (B) =
∑
{ω∈Ω|f(ω)=B}
p(ω), (17)
for all B ⊆ C.
It is clear that these two situations can occur simultaneously, i.e., we may
have a mass function m on Ω, and ill-known consequences. In that case, Equa-
tions (16) and (17) become
µf (B) =
∑
{A⊆Ω|⋃ω∈A f(ω)=B}
m(A), (18)
for all B ⊆ C.
Example 4 Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and m the following mass function on Ω:
m({ω1, ω2}) = 0.3, m({ω2, ω3}) = 0.2,
m({ω3}) = 0.4, m(Ω) = 0.1. (19)
Let C = {c1, c2, c3} and f the act
f(ω1) = {c1}, f(ω2) = {c1, c2}, f(ω3) = {c2, c3}. (20)
To compute the induced mass function on C, we transfer the masses as follows:
m({ω1, ω2}) = 0.3→ f(ω1) ∪ f(ω2) = {c1, c2} (21a)
m({ω2, ω3}) = 0.2→ f(ω2) ∪ f(ω3) = {c1, c2, c3} (21b)
m({ω3}) = 0.4→ f(ω3) = {c2, c3} (21c)
m(Ω) = 0.1→ f(ω1) ∪ f(ω2) ∪ f(ω3) = {c1, c2, c3}. (21d)
Finally, we obtain the following mass function on C:
µf ({c1, c2}) = 0.3, µf ({c2, c3}) = 0.4, µf ({c1, c2, c3}) = 0.3. (22)
In any of the situations considered above, we can assign to each act f an
evidential lottery µf on C. Determining preferences among acts then amounts
to determining preferences among evidential lotteries. Several methods general-
izing the decision criteria reviewed in Section 2 will first be reviewed in Section
4. Decision methods based on the imprecise-probability view of belief functions
will then be presented in Section 5.
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4 Extensions of Classical Criteria
As recalled in Section 3.1, belief functions can be seen both as generalized sets
and as generalized probabilities. As a consequence, criteria for decision-making
with belief functions can be constructed by blending the criteria for decision
under ignorance reviewed in Section 2.2 with the MEU principle recalled in
Section 2.3. These criteria will be examined in Sections 4.1 to 4.5, and axiomatic
arguments will be discussed in Section 4.6. Finally, partial preference relations
among evidential lotteries will be discussed in Section 4.7.
4.1 Upper and Lower Expected Utilities
Let µ be a mass function on C, and u a utility function C → R. The lower
and upper expectations of u with respect to µ are defined, respectively, as the
averages of the minima and the maxima of u within each focal set of µ [6, 32, 9]:
Eµ(u) =
∑
A⊆C
µ(A) min
c∈A
u(c), (23a)
Eµ(u) =
∑
A⊆C
µ(A) max
c∈A
u(c). (23b)
It is clear that Eµ(u) ≤ Eµ(u), with the inequality becoming an equality when
µ is Bayesian, in which case the lower and upper expectations collapse to the
usual expectation. If µ is logical with focal set A, then Eµ(u) and Eµ(u) are,
respectively, the minimum and the maximum of u in A. As shown [18], the lower
and upper expectations are Choquet integrals [4] with respect to the belief and
plausibility functions, respectively.
Based on the notions of lower and upper expectations, we can define two
complete preference relations among evidential lotteries as
µ1 <∗ µ2 iff Eµ1(u) ≥ Eµ2(u) (24)
and
µ1 <∗ µ2 iff Eµ1(u) ≥ Eµ2(u). (25)
Relation <∗ corresponds to a pessimistic (or conservative) attitude of the DM,
since it takes in account the least favorable consequence within each focal set.
When µ is logical, <∗ corresponds to the maximin criterion. Symmetrically,
<∗ corresponds to an optimistic attitude and extends the maximax criterion.
For this reason, the strategies of maximizing the lower and upper expected
utilities can be referred to as (generalized) maximin and (generalized) maximax,
respectively. Both criteria boil down to the EU criterion when µ is Bayesian.
Example 5 Consider again the investment example, with the utility matrix
shown in Table 2. Assume that uncertainty about the state of nature Ω is de-
scribed by the following mass function:
m({ω1}) = 0.4, m({ω1, ω2}) = 0.2, m({ω3}) = 0.1, m(Ω) = 0.3.
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Table 5: Aggregated utilities using the OWA aggregation operator with β = 0.2
and β = 0.7 and the payoff matrix of Example 1.
ui1 ui2 ui3 Eµi(u) Eµi(u)
f1 37 25 23 29.0 35.6
f2 49 70 2 30.2 54.8
f3 4 96 1 2.8 49.7
f4 22 76 25 22.3 49.3
Consider, for instance, act f1. It induces the following evidential lottery:
µ1({c11}) = 0.4, µ1({c11, c12}) = 0.2, µ1({c13}) = 0.1, µ1({c11, c12, c13}) = 0.3,
with u(c11) = 37, u(c12) = 25 and u(c13) = 23. Consequently, the lower and
upper expected utilities can be computed as
Eµ1(u) = 0.4× 37 + 0.2× 25 + 0.1× 23 + 0.3× 23 = 29
Eµ1(u) = 0.4× 37 + 0.2× 37 + 0.1× 23 + 0.3× 37 = 35.6
The lower and upper expected expectations for the fours acts are shown in Table
5. The corresponding strict preference relations among acts are f2 ∗ f1 ∗
f4 ∗ f3 and f2 ∗ f3 ∗ f4 ∗ f1.
4.2 Generalized Hurwicz Criterion
Just as the lower and upper expected utility models generalize, respectively,
the maximin and maximax criteria, the Hurwicz criterion (3) can be readily
generalized by defining the expectation of u, for a pessimism index α ∈ [0, 1],
as
Eµ,α(u) =
∑
A⊆C
µ(A)
(
αmin
c∈A
u(c) + (1− α) max
c∈A
u(c)
)
(26a)
= αEµ(u) + (1− α)Eµ(u). (26b)
A more general version of this criterion (where α in (26a) depends on A) was first
introduced by Jaffray [22, 23], who also justified it axiomatically (see Section
4.6 below). Criterion (26) with fixed α was later discussed by Strat [43], who
proposed to interpret α as the DM’s subjective probability that the ambiguity
will be resolved unfavorably (see also [42] for a discussion of this criterion).
Hereafter, we will use the term “Hurwicz criterion” to refer to decision based
on (26), as this principle is a direct extension to the Hurwicz criterion in the
case of complete ignorance.
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4.3 Pignistic Criterion
A completely different approach to decision-making with belief function was
advocated by Smets as part of the Transferable Belief Model, a variant of
Dempster-Shafer theory [37, 40, 38]. Smets defended a two-level mental model,
composed of a credal level, where an agent’s belief are represented by belief
functions, and the pignistic level, where decisions are made by maximizing EU
with respect to a probability measure derived from a belief function. The ratio-
nale for introducing probabilities at the decision level is the avoidance of Dutch
books, i.e., sequences of bets than incur sure loss [47]. Furthermore, Smets [39]
argued that, as the consequence of the MEU principle, the belief-probability
transformation T should be linear, i.e., it should verify
T
(
αµ1 + (1− α)µ2
)
= αT (µ1) + (1− α)T (µ2), (27)
for any mass functions µ1 and µ2 and for any α ∈ [0, 1]. He then showed that
the only transformation T verifying (27) is the pignistic transformation, with
pµ = T (µ) given by
pµ(c) =
∑
A⊆C
µ(A)
|A| I(c ∈ A), (28)
for any c ∈ C. The pignistic probability pµ turns out to be mathematically
identical to the Shapley value in cooperative game theory [36]. The expected
utility w.r.t. the pignistic probability is
Ep(u) =
∑
c∈C
pµ(c)u(c) (29a)
=
∑
c∈C
u(c)
∑
{A⊆C|c∈A}
µ(A)
|A| (29b)
=
∑
{A⊆C}
µ(A)
 1
|A|
∑
c∈A
u(c)
 . (29c)
The maximum pignistic expected utility criterion thus averages the mean utility
inside each focal set A. Consequently, it extends the Laplace criterion discussed
in Section 2.2, when uncertainty is quantified by a belief function.
Example 6 Continuing Example 5, the pignistic expected utility of act f1 is
Ep1(u) = 0.4× 37 + 0.2×
37 + 25
2
+ 0.1× 23 + 0.3× 37 + 25 + 23
3
= 31.8.
Similarly, we find Ep2(u) = 43.8, Ep3(u) = 21.8 and Ep4(u) = 33.4.
Remark 1 We have seen in Section 2.2 that the Laplace criterion for decision-
making under ignorance may lead to different decisions when a state of nature
is “duplicated”, i.e., when the state space Ω is refined. The pignistic criterion
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obviously has the same drawback: refining the frame of discernment changes the
pignistic probability. Smets [40] tried to circumvent this difficulty by stating that
the DM needs to select a “betting frame” before computing the pignistic probabil-
ity. It is not always clear, however, on which basis such a choice can be made.
Wilson [55] showed that the lower and upper expectations (23) are, respectively,
the minimum and the maximum of the pignistic expectations computed over all
refinements of the frame of discernment.
Remark 2 There are obviously other ways of transforming a belief function
into a probability distribution. Voorbraak [49] and Cobb and Shenoy [5] have
argued for the plausibility transformation, which approximates a belief function
by a probability distribution, in such a way that the probability of singletons
is proportional to their plausibility. This transformation has the remarkable
property of being compatible with Dempster’s rule (i.e., the approximation of
the orthogonal sum of two belief functions is the orthogonal sum of their ap-
proximations). This property makes the plausibility transformation suitable for
approximating a DS model by a probabilistic model. To our knowledge, no ar-
gument has been put forward in favor of using this approximating probability
distribution for decision-making.
4.4 Generalized OWA Criterion
A more general family of expected utility criteria can be defined by aggregating
the utilities u(c) within each focal set A ⊆ C using OWA operators as recalled
in Section 2.2 [59]. It is clear that the previous definitions in Sections 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3 are recovered as special cases. To determine the weights of the OWA
operators, Yager [59] proposed to fix the degree of optimism β defined by (7),
and to use the maximum-entropy operators, for each cardinality |A|. Formally,
Eowaµ,β (u) =
∑
A⊆C
µ(A)F|A|,β({u(c)|c ∈ A}), (30)
where F|A|,β is the maximum-entropy OWA operator with degree of optimism
β and arity |A|. We can remark that parameter β plays the same role here, and
has roughly the same interpretation, as one minus the pessimism index α in the
Hurwicz criterion. However, each quantity F|A|,β({u(c)|c ∈ A}) depends on all
the values u(c) for all c ∈ A, and not only on the minimum and the maximum,
and the pignistic criterion is recovered for β = 0.5. This method is further
discussed in Ref. [56].
Example 7 Considering again the investment example and the mass function
of Examples 5 and 6, Figure 2 shows the aggregated utilities for the Hurwicz
criteria as functions of α (Figure 2(a)) and for the generalized OWA criterion
as functions of 1−β (Figure 2(b)). Once again, we can see that this two criteria
yield similar results, and that the pignistic expectations are obtained as a special
case of the generalized OWA criterion with β = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Aggregated utilities vs. pessimism index α for the generalized Hurwicz
criterion (a) and vs. one minus the degree of optimism β for the generalized
OWA criterion (b). (Example 7).
4.5 Generalized Minimax Regret
Finally, Yager [60] also extended the minimax regret criterion to belief functions.
As in Section 2.2, we need to consider n acts f1, . . . , fn, and we write uij =
u[fi(ωj)]. The regret if act fi is selected, and state ωj occurs, is rij = maxk ukj−
uij . For a non-empty subset A of Ω, the maximum regret of act fi is
Ri(A) = max
ωj∈A
rij . (31)
Given a mass function m on Ω, the expected maximal regret for act fi is
Ri =
∑
∅6=A⊆Ω
m(A)Ri(A). (32)
Using the generalized minimax regret criterion, act fi is preferred over act fk if
Ri ≤ Rk. The minimax regret criterion of decision-making under ignorance is
recovered when m is logical. If m is Bayesian, we have
Ri =
∑
j
m({ωj})rij (33a)
=
∑
j
m({ωj})(max
k
ukj − uij) (33b)
=
∑
j
m({ωj}) max
k
ukj −
∑
j
m({ωj})uij . (33c)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (33c) does not depend on i, and
the second one is the expected utility. Hence, the generalized minimax regret
criterion is identical to the MEU model when m is Bayesian.
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Example 8 The regrets rij for the investment data are given in Table 3. With
the mass function of Example 5, we get, for act f1:
R1 = 0.4× 12 + 0.2× 71 + 0.1× 2 + 0.3× 71 = 40.5.
Similarly, we have R2 = 15.3, R3 = 42.9 and R4 = 24.3. The corresponding
preference relation is, thus, f2  f4  f1  f3.
4.6 Axiomatic Arguments
Except for generalized minimax regret, the criteria for decision-making with
belief functions decision reviewed above are all of the form
µ1 < µ2 iff U(µ1) ≥ U(µ2), (34)
where U is a function from the set of evidential lotteries to R, such that
U(µ) =
∑
∅6=A⊆C
µ(A)U(µA), (35)
where µA is the logical mass function with focal set A. To simplify the notation,
we can write U(A) in place of U(µA), and u(c) for U({c}). With these notations,
we have
• U(A) = minc∈A u(c) for the maxmin criterion;
• U(A) = maxc∈A u(c) for the maximax criterion;
• U(A) = αminc∈A u(c) + (1− α) maxc∈A u(c) for the Hurwicz criterion;
• U(A) = (1/|A|)∑c∈A u(c) for the pignistic criterion;
• U(A) = F|A|,β({u(c)|c ∈ A}) for the OWA criterion.
Jaffray [23] showed that a preference relation < among evidential lotteries is
representable by a linear utility function verifying (35) if and only if it verifies the
Von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms (see Section 2.3) extended to evidential
lotteries, i.e.,
Transitivity and Completeness: < is a transitive and complete relation (i.e.,
a complete preorder);
Continuity: for all µ1, µ2 and µ3 such that µ1  µ2  µ3, there exists α, β in
(0, 1) such that
αµ1 + (1− α)µ3  µ2  βµ1 + (1− β)µ3; (36)
Independence: for all µ1, µ2 and µ3, and for all α in (0, 1), µ1  µ2 implies
αµ1 + (1− α)µ3  αµ2 + (1− α)µ3. (37)
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It is clear that U(µ) in (35) becomes the expected utility when µ is Bayesian:
we then have
U(µ) =
∑
c∈C
µ({c})u(c). (38)
The major difference with the classical EU model is that we now need, in the
general case, to elicit the utility values U(A) for each subset A ⊆ C of conse-
quences, which limits the practical use of the method. However, Jaffray [23]
showed that a major simplification of (35) can be achieved by introducing an
additional axiom. To present this axiom, let us introduce the following nota-
tion. Let us write c1 < c2 whenever µ{c1} < µ{c2}. Furthermore, let cA and cA
denote, respectively, the worst and the best consequence in A. The additional
axiom can then be stated as follows:
Dominance: for all non-empty subsets A and B of C, if cA < cB and cA < cB ,
then µA < µB .
This axiom was justified by Jaffray [23] as follows. If cA < cB and cA < cB ,
it is possible to construct a set Ω of states of nature, and two acts f : Ω → A
and f ′ : Ω → B, such that, for any ω ∈ Ω, f(ω) < f ′(ω). As act f dominates
f ′, it should be preferred whatever the information on Ω. Hence, f should be
preferred to f ′ when we have a vacuous mass function on Ω, in which case f
and f ′ induce, respectively, the logical mass function µA and µB on C.
The Dominance axiom immediately implies that, for any non-empty subsets
A and B of C, if cA ∼ cB and cA ∼ cB , then µA ∼ µB , and U(A) = U(B).
Hence, U(A) depends only on the worst and the least consequence in A, and we
can write U(A) = u(cA, cA). Equation (35) thus becomes
U(µ) =
∑
∅6=A⊆C
µ(A)u(cA, cA). (39)
If one accepts the Dominance axiom, one is the led to rejecting the pignistic
criterion, as well as the generalized OWA criterion, except when it is identical
to the Hurwicz criterion.
To describe the DM’s attitude to ambiguity, Jaffray [23] then introduced the
local pessimism index α(c, c), defined as the value of α which makes the DM
indifferent between:
1. Receiving at least c and at most c, with no further information, and
2. Receiving either c with probability α or c with probability 1− α.
We then have
u(c, c) = α(c, c)u(c) + (1− α(c, c))u(c). (40)
This relation shows how the DM’s attitudes to risk and to ambiguity jointly
determine U . Now, the utility of evidential lottery µ can be written as
U(µ) =
∑
∅6=A⊆C
µ(A)
[
α(cA, cA)u(cA) + (1− α(cA, cA))u(cA)
]
. (41)
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The Hurwicz criterion (26) corresponds to the case where α(c, c) is equal to a
constant α.
Jaffray’s axioms are the counterpart of the axioms of Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (see Section 2.3) for decision under risk: assuming uncertainty
about the consequences of each act to be described by belief functions, they
justify the decision strategy maximizing the utility criterion (41) for evidential
lotteries.
Remark 3 Until now, there is no decision-theoretic justification of belief func-
tions similar to Savage’s axioms for probabilities. There are, however, two re-
markable results that justify the use of belief functions for decision-making. In-
terestingly, both results also justify Jaffray’s decision criterion (41). The first of
these results is due to Jaffray and Wakker [24] (see also [50]), who consider the
situation where objective probabilities are defined on a finite set S, and there is a
multi-valued mapping Γ that maps each element s ∈ S to a subset Γ(s) of the set
Ω of states of nature. The authors thus do not postulate a belief function in the
first place, but start one step before, i.e., they postulate the existence of a source,
which induces a belief function Bel (see Section 3.1). Each act f : Ω→ C then
carries Bel from Ω to C, i.e., it induces an evidential lottery. The authors then
justify a neutrality axiom, which states that two acts are indifferent whenever
they generate the same evidential lottery. Finally, they derive the decision cri-
terion (41) from two axioms: a continuity condition, and a weakened version
of Savage’s sure-thing principle. Interestingly, a similar criterion was obtained
in [15], for the case where an act is defined as a multi-valued mapping from Ω
to 2C. By postulating axioms similar to those of Savage, and two additional ax-
ioms, Ghirardato proved that the preference relation among acts is represented
by a utility function similar to (41).
Remark 4 Giang and Shenoy [17] have proposed an alternative set of axioms,
leading to a different decision criterion (see also [16]). Their approach, how-
ever, is restricted to the case of partially consonant mass functions. A mass
function m is said to be partially consonant if its focal sets can be divided into
groups such that (a) the focal sets of different groups do not intersect and (b) the
focal sets of the same group are nested. The family of partially consonant mass
functions includes Bayesian and consonant mass functions as special cases. In
the context of statistical inference, Walley [52] has shown that partially conso-
nant mass functions arise as a consequence of some axioms. There does not
seem, however, to be any compelling reason for constraining belief functions to
be partially consonant outside the specific context of statistical inference.
4.7 Dropping the Completeness Requirement
If one drops the requirement that the preference relation among evidential lot-
teries be complete, then one can adopt the following partial preference relation,
called the strong dominance or interval dominance relation [45]:
µ1 <SD µ2 iff Eµ1(u) ≥ Eµ2(u). (42)
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Given a collection of evidential lotteries µ1, . . . , µn, we can then consider the set
of non-dominated elements with respect to the strict preference relation SD.
The choice set is then
MSD = {µ ∈ {µ1, . . . , µn} | ∀µ′ ∈ {µ1, . . . , µn},¬(µ′ SD µ)}. (43)
However, condition (42) is very strong, and many pairs of mass functions will
typically not be comparable. As a consequence, choice set (43) will often be too
large. Additionally, the strong dominance relation (42) seems hard to justify
outside the imprecise-probability setting (see Section 5).
A weaker partial preference relation, which does not seem to have been
mentioned in the literature, is the weak dominance relation defined as follows:
µ1 <WD µ2 iff
(
Eµ1(u) ≥ Eµ2(u)
)
and
(
Eµ1(u) ≥ Eµ2(u)
)
. (44)
Obviously, µ1 <SD µ2 implies µ1 <WD µ2, so that relation <WD compares
more pairs of mass functions than <SD does. Further, weak dominance can be
justified as follows: µ1 is at least as desirable as µ2 according to weak dominance
iff it is at least as desirable as µ2 according to the Hurwicz criterion for any value
of the pessimism index α. Formally,
(µ1 <WD µ2)⇔
(∀α ∈ [0, 1], Eµ1,α(u) ≥ Eµ2,α(u)) , (45)
where Eµ1,α(u) and Eµ2,α(u) are defined by Eq. (26). Weak dominance thus
implements a conservative approach that seems appropriate if one accepts the
Hurwicz criterion while being totally ignorant about the DM’s attitude towards
ambiguity.
Example 9 As we can see from Table 5 and Figure 2, no pair of acts (fi, fj)
is such that Eµi(u) ≥ Eµj (u). Consequently, the choice set for the strong dom-
inance relation is {f1, f2, f3, f4}, i.e., the strong dominance criterion does not
allow us to compare any of the four acts. For the weak dominance criterion, we
can see that act f2 dominates the other three acts, but is not dominated by any
other act. Consequently, the choice set for the weak dominance relation is {f2}.
5 Imprecise-Probability View
As recalled in Section 3.1, a belief function is a coherent lower probability for a
convex set of compatible probability measures. Consequently, decision criteria
proposed in the imprecise-probability framework [45, 20] are also applicable
when uncertainty is described by belief functions. To keep the exposition simple,
we assume that we are in the case where we have a mass function m on Ω and
acts are mappings from Ω to C. For each act fi, we denote by gi = u ◦ fi the
function that maps each ωj in Ω to the utility uij = u[fi(ωj)]. Function gi from
Ω to R is called a gamble. The lower and upper expectations defined by Eq.
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(23) can be rewritten using (16) as follows:
Eµ(u) =
∑
A⊆C
µ(A) inf
c∈A
u(c) (46a)
=
∑
A⊆C
 ∑
B⊆Ω:f(B)=A
m(B)
 infc∈Au(c) (46b)
=
∑
B⊆Ω
m(B) inf
c∈f(B)
u(c) (46c)
=
∑
B⊆Ω
m(B) inf
ω∈B
u(f(ω)) = Em(g), (46d)
with g = u ◦ f . Similarly, Eµ(u) can be written as Em(g). The mappings
g → Em(g) and g → Em(g) are called, respectively, lower and upper previsions
[53]. An important result is that these lower and upper expectations can be in-
terpreted as lower and upper bounds of expectations with respect to compatible
probability measures [32, 54, 18]. In other words, the mean of minima in (46d)
is also the minimum of means (expectations) with respect to all compatible
probability measures; similarly, the mean of maxima is the maximum of means
[18]. Formally, we have the following equalities:
Em(g) = min
P∈P(m)
EP (g) (47a)
Em(g) = max
P∈P(m)
EP (g). (47b)
The interval
[
Em(g),Em(g)
]
can, thus, be seen as the range of EP (g) for all
probability measures P in the credal set of m.
As a consequence of the above result, the strong dominance relation (42)
has a natural interpretation in the imprecise-probability setting. Let g1 and
g2 be two gambles. By abuse of notation, we can use the same symbol for
the preference relations among gambles and among evidential lotteries. Thus,
g1 <SD g2 iff Em(g1) ≥ Em(g2), i.e., iff for any two probability measures P1 and
P2 compatible with m, the expectation of g1 with respect to P1 is always higher
that the expectation of g2 with respect to P2. Formally,
g1 <SD g2 ⇔
(
∀(P1, P2) ∈ P(m)2, EP1(g1) ≥ EP2(g2)
)
. (48)
A gamble g is, thus, a maximal element of <SD if, for any gamble g′, there
exists probability measures P and Q in P(m) such that EP (g) ≥ EQ(g′). This
set is arguably too large, as P and Q are not required to be identical. Two
more useful decision criteria developed in the imprecise-probability framework
will now be discussed in Section 5.1 and 5.2.
5.1 Maximality
The maximality criterion was introduced by Walley [53, Section 3.9, page 160].
It states that gamble g1 is at least as desirable as g2 if the lower expectation of
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g1 − g2 is positive:
g1 <max g2 iff Em(g1 − g2) ≥ 0, (49)
and the preference is strict if the inequality in the right-hand side of (49) is
strict. In Walley’s theory, a lower prevision is interpreted as the highest price
an agent is willing to pay to acquire a gamble. Clearly, Eq. (49) expresses that
the DM is willing to pay a positive price to get g1 instead of g2, i.e., that he
strictly prefers g1 to g2. In terms of credal set, the condition Em(g1 − g2) ≥ 0
means that, for any compatible probability P , the expectation of g1 − g2 with
respect to P is positive, i.e.:
g1 <max g2 iff
(∀P ∈ P(m), EP (g1) ≥ EP (g2)) . (50)
Comparing Eqs (48) and (50), it is clear that g1 <SD g2 ⇒ g1 <max g2, and
the implication is strict. A gamble g is a maximal element of max iff, for
any gamble g′, there exists P ∈ P(m) such that EP (g) ≥ EP (g′). The set of
maximal elements of max is, thus, included in that of SD.
The maximality criterion thus seems to be better founded and more useful
than strong dominance. However, these advantages come at a price, as finding
the maximal elements according to the maximality criterion requires computing
n2 − n lower expectations (where n is the number of gambles), against n lower
expectations and as many upper expectations for the strong dominance criterion
[45]. Hence, strong dominance has a computational advantage when the number
of alternatives is large. As the choice set of SD contains that of max, it can
also be computed as a preliminary step to reduce the number operations needed
to implement the maximality criterion.
Finally, we can remark that maximality, although introduced and studied
in the imprecise-probability context, also makes sense regardless of any notion
of imprecise probability. In the DS framework, Eq. (49) can be understood to
mean that, if one DM selects g1 and another DM selects g2, then the former is
expected to gain a higher utility, even assuming that ambiguity will be resolved
in favor of the latter.
Example 10 Consider again the pay-off matrix of Table 2 and the mass func-
tion m of Example 5. We have g1(ω1) = 37, g1(ω2) = 25, g1(ω3) = 23 and
g2(ω1) = 49, g2(ω2) = 70, g3(ω3) = 2. Hence,
Em(g1 − g2) = 0.4× (−12) + 0.2× (−45) + 0.1× 21 + 0.3× (−45) = −25.2
and
Em(g2 − g1) = 0.4× (12) + 0.2× (12) + 0.1× (−21) + 0.3× (−21) = −1.2.
Consequently, g1 and g2 are not comparable by the maximality criterion. The
matrix ∆g with general term [∆g]ij = Em(gi − gj) is
∆g =

· −25.2 −20.1 −19.7
−1.2 · 5.1 0.4
−31.9 −40.6 · −20.4
−13.3 −22.0 −0.4 ·
 .
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We thus have g2 max g3 and g2 max g4, whereas g1 and g2 are not dominated
by any other gamble. Consequently, the choice set for the maximality criterion
is {g1, g2}.
5.2 E-admissibility
As we have seen in the previous section, a gamble g belongs to the choice set
according to the maximality criterion if it has a higher expected utility than
any other gamble g′ for some probability P that may depend on g′. The e-
admissibility criterion [26, page 96] strengthens this condition by requiring the
existence of a compatible probability P for which g has higher expected utility
than any other gamble. Formally, g is in the choice set according to the e-
admissibility criterion iff there exists P in P(m) such that, for any gamble g′,
EP (g) ≥ EP (g′). This definition results in a choice set that is included in that
of the maximality criterion. In [30], Seidenfeld compared the maximin and e-
admissibility criteria, and argued for the latter in sequential decision problems.
We can remark that, in contrast with other decision criteria mentioned until
now, e-admissibility defines a choice set directly, without explicitly defining a
preference relation. We can, however, construct a preference relation from the
choice set, as explained in Section 2.1.
The meaning of the e-admissibility criterion seems to be more deeply rooted
in the theory of imprecise probability than that of maximality. Moreover, it
is much more costly to implement computationally: to determine whether a
gamble is e-admissible, we need to solve a linear programming problem [46, 19].
In the case when uncertainty about the state of nature is described by a mass
function m, this problem can be formulated using the allocation function (13).
Let F1, . . . , Fq denote the focal sets of m (where q can be much smaller than
2n), akj = a(ωk, Fj) for all (k, j) such that ωk ∈ Fj , a a vector contain-
ing all the akj ’s, p the vector of probabilities p = (p1, . . . , ps), and λ =
(λ1, . . . , λi−1, λi+1, . . . , λn) a vector of n − 1 slack variables. To determine
whether gamble gi is e-admissible, we can solve the following problem:
min
λ,a,p
∑
l 6=i
λl
subject to: ∑
{k|ωk∈Fj}
akj = m(Fj), j = 1, . . . , q (51a)
akj ≥ 0 ∀(k, j) : ∃(ωk, Fj), ωk ∈ Fj (51b)
pk =
q∑
j=1
akj , k = 1, . . . , s (51c)
s∑
k=1
pk(uik − ulk) + λl ≥ 0, l 6= i (51d)
λl ≥ 0, l 6= i. (51e)
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Eqs. (51a) and (51b) express that the akj ’s define an allocation function, and
Eq. (51c) expresses that the pk are compatible probabilities. Eq. (51d) can
be written as EP (gi) + λl ≥ EP (gl), where P is the probability measure such
that P ({ωk}) = pk for k = 1, . . . , s. By minimizing the sum of the λl’s under
constraints (51a)-(51e), we get the solution λ = 0 iff there exists P ∈ P(m) such
that EP (gi) ≥ EP (gl) for all l, i.e., iff gamble gi is e-admissible. To determine the
set of e-admissible gambles, we can start with the choice set of the maximality
criterion, and solve the linear program above for each element in that set.
Example 11 In Example 10, we found that g1 and g2 are in the choice set of
the maximality criterion. Let F1 = {ω1}, F2 = {ω1, ω2}, F3 = {ω3} and F4 =
{ω1, ω2, ω3} be the focal sets of m. We recall that m(F1) = 0.4, m(F2) = 0.2,
m(F3) = 0.1 and m(F4) = 0.3. To find out whether, e.g., g1 is e-admissible, we
solve the following linear programming problem:
min
λ,a,p
λ2 + λ3 + λ4
subject to:
a12 + a22 = 0.2
a14 + a24 + a34 = 0.3
p1 = 0.4 + a12 + a14
p2 = a22 + a24
p3 = 0.1 + a34
(37− 49)p1 + (25− 70)p2 + (23− 2)p3 ≥ 0
(37− 4)p1 + (25− 91)p2 + (23− 1)p3 ≥ 0
(37− 22)p1 + (25− 76)p2 + (23− 25)p3 ≥ 0,
all the variables being positive. We find the solution λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0, a12 =
0.2, a22 = 0, a14 = a24 = 0, a34 = 0.3, p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.3 and p3 = 0.4.
Consequently, gamble g1 is e-admissible. Using the same method, g2 can be
shown to be also e-admissible.
6 Shafer’s Constructive Decision Theory
All the decision criteria reviewed so far rely on the concept of utility. In the
axiomatic frameworks developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern in [48] as
well as Jaffray in [23], utilities are derived from preferences among, respectively,
probabilistic and evidential lotteries. In Savage’s axiomatic system [29], they
are derived from preferences among acts. However, in practice, probabilities (or
degrees of belief) and utilities are often elicited from the DM. It is then assumed
that probabilities and utilities can be determined independently. Furthermore,
the term “elicitation” suggests that the DM already has probabilities and util-
ities in the back of his mind, and that these values only need to be guessed as
accurately as possible.
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In [34], Shafer questions these two assumptions. First, he argues, after
Savage [29, pages 83-84], that when assigning a utility to some consequence cor-
responding to some way things may turn out, we implicitly “assess probabilities
for how further matters will turn out” [34, page 46]. For instance, to assessing
the utility of buying a new car, I need to assess probabilities for various events
such as: the possible withdrawal of my driving license, various health problems
that could affect my ability to drive, etc. If we assume that predetermined
utilities are waiting to be elicited, then it might not matter if utilities are, in
fact, expected utilities. However, Shafer questions the existence of preexisting
probabilities and utilities, and argues that these values need to be constructed.
Probabilities and degrees of belief can be constructed by comparing the problem
at hand with a scale of canonical examples such as randomly-coded messages [32]
(see Section 3.1). For utilities, however, it might be difficult or even impossible
to ensure that utilities constructed at some level of description are consistent
with probabilities and utilities that would be constructed at a more detailed
level of description. This is what Shafer calls “the problem of small worlds”.
6.1 Formulation of a Decision Problem using Goals
Based on the arguments above, Shafer suggested that a constructive decision
theory should be based not on utilities, but on goals. A goal may be defined
as a “consequence” the DM decides to value and to which he attaches util-
ity irrespective of whatever else happens [34]. The vocabulary of goals fits a
constructive theory of decision because goals obviously have to be made. It
avoids utility’s problem of small worlds as goals constructed at a certain level
of description “by conscious thought and deliberation are the clearest and most
definitely structured of all our goals and motives” [34].
As explained in Section 2.1, the standard decision-theoretic framework dis-
tinguishes between a set Ω of states of nature (or facts about the world that
can determine the consequences of our acts), and a set of consequences C, which
specifies how things that the DM cares about may turn out. In contrast, Shafer
proposes to use a single frame of discernment Θ, defined as a set of collectively
exhaustive and mutually exclusive descriptions of how things may turn out. A
goal can then be defined as a subset of Θ. Typically, a DM formulates n goals
A1, . . . , An. These goals are consistent if their intersection is non-empty, and
they are monotonic is the subsets are nested, i.e., if for any two goals Ai and
Aj , we have either Ai ⊆ Aj or Aj ⊆ Ai. One can argue that goals should
always be consistent, but two goals initially defined as consistent can become
inconsistent after restricting the frame Θ to a subset Θ0 as a consequence of
acquiring new knowledge. However, monotonic goals A1, . . . , An can never be
made inconsistent after intersection the subsets Ai with some subset Θ0.
6.2 Evaluating Acts
Assume that performing act f ensures that things will turn out according to
one of the descriptions in some subset A(f) ⊆ Θ. One of the simplest way to
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evaluate f is to count the number of goals it achieves,
u+(f) = #{i | A(f) ⊆ Ai}, (52)
and the number of goals it precludes,
u−(f) = #{i | A(f) ∩Ai = ∅}. (53)
We can then assign act f the score
U(f) = u+(f)− u−(f). (54)
This method can be extended in two directions. First, we may attach weights
w1, . . . , wn to the goals. The total weight of the goals achieved by action f is
u+(f) =
∑
{i|A(f)⊆Ai}
wi, (55)
and the total weight of the goals precluded by f is
u−(f) =
∑
{i|A(f)∩Ai=∅}
wi. (56)
As before, the score of f can be defined as U(f) = u+(f)− u−(f).
The second important extension is to allow uncertainty in the relation be-
tween acts and goal satisfaction. Assume that the effect of act f is represented
by a mass function mf on Θ, with focal sets F1, . . . , Fq. The expected total
weight of goals achieved by action f is then
E
(
u+(f)
)
=
q∑
j=1
mf (Fj)
∑
{i|Fj⊆Ai}
wi, (57a)
=
n∑
i=1
wi
∑
{j|Fj⊆Ai}
mf (Fj) (57b)
=
n∑
i=1
wiBelf (Ai), (57c)
where Belf is the belief function associated to mf . Similarly, the expected total
weight of goals precluded by action f is
E
(
u−(f)
)
=
q∑
j=1
mf (Fj)
∑
{i|Fj∩Ai=∅}
wi, (58a)
=
n∑
i=1
wi
∑
{j|Fj∩Ai=∅}
mf (Fj) (58b)
=
n∑
i=1
wiBelf (Ai) (58c)
=
n∑
i=1
wi −
n∑
i=1
wiPlf (Ai). (58d)
29
Dropping the constant term
∑n
i=1 wi, the score of f can now be defined as
U(f) =
n∑
i=1
wi
(
Belf (Ai) + Plf (Ai)
)
. (59)
To see the connection with the MEU principle, we can define the utility u(θ) of
any element θ of Θ as the total weight of the goals satisfied if θ holds:
u(θ) =
∑
{i|θ∈Ai}
wi. (60)
Let us assume that mf is Bayesian, and let pf (θ) = mf ({θ}) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Then, the quantities u+(f) and u−(f) become, respectively,
u+(f) =
∑
θ∈Θ
pf (θ)u(θ), (61)
and
u−(f) =
n∑
i=1
wi −
∑
θ∈Θ
pf (θ)u(θ). (62)
In that case, the quantity u+(f) thus becomes the Bayesian expected utility,
and u−(f) is redundant. When the mass functions mf on Θ induced by each of
the acts f is Bayesian, Shafer’s method thus boils down to the MEU criterion,
with a suitable definition of the utility function.
Example 12 As an illustration of the way Shafer’s method can be applied in
practice, let us consider a classification problem with a set of K classes Ω =
{ω1, . . . , ωK}. Assume that we want to classify an object with unknown class
Y ∈ Ω, by selecting a non-empty set C ⊆ Ω of possible classes. If Y = ωk and
C = {ωk}, we have a perfectly correct classification. If ωk ∈ C but |C| > 1, then
the classification is still correct, but imprecise. If ωk 6∈ C, we have an error.
The ways things may turn out can be described as follows. On the one hand, the
object may actually belong to any of the K classes. On the other hand, we may
select a set of cardinality k, k = 1, . . . ,K. If the set has cardinality K, then it
surely contains the true class; otherwise, we may have a correct classification or
an error. The frame of discernment Θ can, thus, be defined as follows:
Θ =
(
Ω× {1, . . . ,K − 1} × {correct, error}) ∪ (Ω× {K} × {correct}) .
Our general objective is classify the object correctly while being as precise as
possible. This objective can be broken down into K monotonic goals A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂
. . . ⊂ AK , where
Ak = Ω× {1, . . . , k} × {correct}
is the goal of selecting a set of at most k elements containing the true class.
Goal AK is to select a set containing the true class, whatever its the size; it can
arguably be regarded as the most important, and should be assigned the largest
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Table 6: Calculation of the score of acts in Example 12.
C {ω1} {ω2} {ω1, ω2} {ω3} {ω1, ω3} {ω2, ω3} Ω
Bel(C) + Pl(C) 0.8 1 1.6 0.4 1 1.2 2∑K
k=|C| wk 4 4 3 4 3 3 2
U(fC) 3.2 4 4.8 1.6 3 3.6 4
weight. Let fC denote the act of selecting the non-empty subset C ⊆ Ω, and let
m be a mass function on Ω representing evidence about the class of the object
(as provided, for instance, by an evidential classifier such as described in [11] or
[57]). If |C| = k and Y = ωk, then selecting act fC will satisfy goals Ak, . . . , AK
iff ωk ∈ C. Consequently, the belief and plausibility of achieving each of the goals
Ak, . . . , AK when selecting act fC are, respectively, Bel(C) and Pl(C), and the
score of fC is
U(fC) =
K∑
k=|C|
wk(Bel(C) + Pl(C)) = (Bel(C) + Pl(C))
K∑
k=|C|
wk. (63)
From (63), we can see that U(fC) is a product of two terms, one of which
increases with the size of C due to the monotonicity of mappings Bel and Pl,
and the other one of which decreases with the size of C.
For instance, assume that K = 3, w1 = w2 = 1, w3 = 2, and let m we the
mass function defined as
m({ω1, ω2}) = 0.6, m({ω2, ω3}) = 0.2, m(Ω) = 0.2.
The calculation of U(fC) for each non-empty subset C of classes is detailed in
Table 6. We obtain the following preferences among acts:
f{ω1,ω2}  f{ω2} ∼ fΩ  f{ω2,ω3}  f{ω1}  f{ω1,ω3}  f{ω3}.
7 Conclusions
I have tried in this literature review to provide a broad picture of decision
methods applicable to situations where uncertainty about outcomes is formal-
ized in the belief function framework. Interestingly, all methods boil down to
MEU when the belief function is Bayesian, but they differ in several important
respects in the general case.
The most important distinction between models is whether they produce a
complete preference relation or a partial one. As shown by Jaffray [22], impos-
ing completeness of the preference relation as well as some other requirements
(similar to the Von Neumann and Morgenstern axioms [48] in the probabilis-
tic case) leads to defining the expected utility of an evidential lottery µ as a
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weighted sum
∑
A⊆C µ(A)U(A), where U(A) is the aggregated utility within
focal set A. The Hurwicz and OWA criteria (including the maximin, maximax
and pignistic criteria as special cases) are built on this principle, the minimax
regret being the only notable counterexample. Smets [37, 38, 39] was a strong
advocate of the pignistic criterion, which has been widely used in applications.
The main arguments put forward by Smets to support the pignistic criterion
are the avoidance of Dutch books2 under forced bets (a case for basing deci-
sions on probability distributions, regardless on the way they are constructed)
and the linearity property (27), which uniquely determines the pignistic trans-
formation. Smets initially proposed this requirement as an axiom, but it was
not generally considered as particularly compelling. In [39], he derived it from
the MEU principle, arguing that the linearity requirement is “unavoidable pro-
vided one accepts expected utility theory”. The argument, however, is complex
and would need a critical re-examination. Following a different path, Jaffray
[22] showed that adding a dominance axiom to complete preorder, continuity
and independence axioms implies that the aggregated utility U(A) within set
A should depend only on the utilities of the worst and the best consequences
within that set. Accepting this axiom leads us to discarding the pignistic and
OWA criteria. The most general form of decision criterion resulting from Jaf-
fray’s axioms is based on locally weighting the minimum and the maximum
utility within each focal set using a “local pessimism index”, generalizing the
Hurwicz criterion. We thus have two methods for building a complete preference
relation, supported by different axiomatic arguments: the pignistic and Jaffray
criteria. Both methods depend on some design choices than need to addressed
in practical applications.
Jaffray’s criterion depends on r(r + 1)/2 local pessimism indices, where r is
the total number of consequences. Fixing all these parameters to some constant
α results in the Hurwicz criterion with only one parameter to evaluate. How
to determine this parameter (or the multiple parameters in Jaffray’s criterion)
is an open research question. If our goal is to model the behavior or a DM,
then we could adjust parameters so as to reproduce his behavior in a set of
decision problems. In prediction problems, we might, alternatively, adjust the
parameters to minimize some error criterion, based on the ways things actu-
ally turned out in a set of decision-making situations. Although the pignistic
criterion does not seem to depend on any parameter (which may be key to its
appeal in real applications), it does depend on the granularity level of the frame
of discernment. Smets was aware of this difficulty and assumed that a “bet-
ting frame” had been chosen prior to decision-making. While this choice may
be natural in some applications, this may not always be the case. Wilson [55]
showed that, when considering all refinements of the current frame, the pignistic
expectation ranges between the lower and upper expectations, just as Jaffray’s
2Snow [41] questioned the claim that the transferable belief model, Smets’ version of DS
theory based on a distinction between credal and pignistic levels, avoids Dutch books. Smets
(personal communication) submitted a rebuttal to the Artificial Intelligence journal, but this
response was never published. It would be interesting to re-examine Snow’s arguments and
confront them to Smets’ views as exposed in various writings.
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criterion does. It thus seems that both criteria face critical design issues that
would need to be addressed in future research.
The other main category of decision models relaxes the assumption of com-
plete preferences and allows incomparability between some acts due to lack of
information. This approach has been particularly studied in the literature on
imprecise probability [45, 20], because it is in line with the general philosophy of
allowing imprecision in an agent’s description of uncertainty, and propagating
this uncertainty all the way up to the decision level. However, it is also relevant
within the DS model. The three main criteria reported in the literature are
the strong (interval) dominance, maximality and e-admissibility criteria. I have
proposed a fourth criterion: weak dominance, based on a weak ordering of lower-
upper expectation intervals. The weak dominance criterion lends itself to fast
computation (as does strong dominance), and it has a natural interpretation in
connection with the Hurwicz criterion. Maximality and e-admissibility are well
justified under the imprecise-probability framework, but more work is needed
to study these criteria from the pure DS perspective. One direction might be
to consider the set of pignistic probabilities under all refinements, which Wil-
son [55] showed to be a strict subset of the set of all compatible probabilities.
Could we define decision criteria based on that set, and would they be similar
to, or different from the criteria derived in the imprecise-probability framework?
These are interesting questions that should be addressed in further research.
Finally, Shafer’s constructive decision theory, as exposed in a paper written
in December 1982 [35] but only published in 2016 [34], departs fundamentally
to other approaches and constitutes a category of its own. Shafer questions the
practical relevance of the concept of utility, which, he argues, are not pre-existing
and waiting to be elicited, but need to be constructed. He proposes to shift the
focus from utilities to goals, formalized as subsets of a frame of discernment
comprising both states of nature and “states of the person”, i.e., consequences
of acts. Shafer proposed to score each act by the number of goals they ensure
minus the number of goals they preclude. We note that a partial preference
relation could also be constructed by considering an act f1 to be at least as
desirable as an act f2 if f1 ensures at least as many goals while precluding
at most as many goals. As Shafer’s decision theory has been overlooked until
recently, deeper investigations remain to be carried out to fully understand its
theoretical and practical implications, and to put it in perspective with respect
to other approaches.
From this overview of methods of decision-making with belief functions, it is
clear that a lot of issues related to decision-making with belief functions remain
unsolved and open to investigation. As argued by Bell, Raiffa and Tversky [3]
(cited in [34]), decision models can be evaluated descriptively by their empirical
validity, normatively by their theoretical adequacy, or prescriptively by their
pragmatic value, i.e., by their ability to help people make better decisions. Very
little is known about the value of DS theory as a descriptive model of human
reasoning and decision-making under uncertainty, and considerably more work is
needed to compare the normative and prescriptive values of the various decision
methods reviewed in this paper.
33
References
[1] M. Allais. Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique
des postulats et axiomes de l’e´cole ame´ricaine. Econometrica, 21(4):503–
546, 1953.
[2] K. J. Arrow and L. Hurwicz. An optimality criterion for decision making
under ignorance. In K. J. Arrow and L. Hurwicz, editors, Studies in Re-
source Allocation Processes, pages 463–471. Cambridge University Press,
1977.
[3] D. E. Bell, H. Raiffa, and A. Tversky. Descriptive, normative, and pre-
scriptive interactions in decision making. In D. E. Bell, H. Raiffa, and
A. Tversky, editors, Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative, and Pre-
scriptive Interactions, pages 9–30. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
[4] G. Choquet. The´orie des capacite´s. Annales de l’Institut Fourier (Greno-
ble), V:131–295, 1953.
[5] B. R. Cobb and P. P. Shenoy. On the plausibility transformation method
for translating belief function models to probability models. International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 41(3):314–330, 2006.
[6] A. P. Dempster. Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued
mapping. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 38:325–339, 1967.
[7] A. P. Dempster. A generalization of Bayesian inference (with discussion).
J. R. Statistical Society B, 30:205–247, 1968.
[8] A. P. Dempster. Upper and lower probabilities generated by a random
closed interval. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 39(3):957–966, 1968.
[9] A. P. Dempster and A. Kong. Comment. Stat. Sci., 2(1):32–36, 1987.
[10] T. Denœux. Analysis of evidence-theoretic decision rules for pattern clas-
sification. Pattern Recognition, 30(7):1095–1107, 1997.
[11] T. Denœux. A neural network classifier based on Dempster-Shafer theory.
IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man and Cybernetics A, 30(2):131–150, 2000.
[12] T. Denoeux. 40 years of Dempster-Shafer theory. International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning, 79:1–6, 2016.
[13] D. Dubois and H. Prade. A set-theoretic view of belief functions: logi-
cal operations and approximations by fuzzy sets. International Journal of
General Systems, 12(3):193–226, 1986.
[14] D. Ellsberg. Risk, ambiguity and the savage axioms. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 75(4):643–669, 1961.
34
[15] P. Ghirardato. Coping with ignorance: unforeseen contingencies and non-
additive uncertainty. Economic theory, 17:247–276, 2001.
[16] P. H. Giang. Decision with Dempster-Shafer belief functions: Decision
under ignorance and sequential consistency. International Journal of Ap-
proximate Reasoning, 53(1):38 – 53, 2012.
[17] P. H. Giang and P. P. Shenoy. A decision theory for partially consonant be-
lief functions. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 52(3):375–
394, 2011.
[18] I. Gilboa and D. Schmeidler. Additive representations of non-additive mea-
sures and the Choquet integral. Annals of Operations Research, 51:43–65,
1994.
[19] N. Huntley, R. Hable, and M. C. M. Troffaes. Computation. In M. C. M.
Troffaes and R. Hable, editors, Introduction to Imprecise Probabilities,
chapter 16, pages 329–337. Wiley, 2014.
[20] N. Huntley, R. Hable, and M. C. M. Troffaes. Decision making. In T. Au-
gustin, F. P. A. Coolen, G. de Cooman, and M. C. M. Troffaes, editors,
Introduction to Imprecise Probabilities, chapter 8, pages 190–206. Wiley,
2014.
[21] L. Hurwicz. The generalized Bayes minimax principle: a criterion for deci-
sion making under uncertainty. Cowles Commission Discussion Paper 355,
February 1951.
[22] J.-Y. Jaffray. Application of linear utility theory to belief functions. In
B. Bouchon, L. Saitta, and R. Yager, editors, Uncertainty and Intelligent
Systems, volume 313 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–8.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988.
[23] J.-Y. Jaffray. Linear utility theory for belief functions. Operations Research
Letters, 8(2):107–112, 1989.
[24] J.-Y. Jaffray and P. Wakker. Decision making with belief functions: com-
patibility and incompatibility with the sure-thing principle. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 8:255–271, 1994.
[25] C. Jansen, G. Schollmeyer, and T. Augustin. Quantifying degrees of e-
admissibility in decision making with imprecise probabilities. Technical
Report 215, Department of Statistics, University of Munich, 2018.
[26] I. Levi. The Enterprise of Knowledge. An Essay on Knowledge, Credal
Probability, and Chance. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1983.
[27] R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical
Survey. Wiley, New York, 1957.
35
[28] L. J. Savage. The theory of statistical decision. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 46:55–67, 1951.
[29] L. J. Savage. The foundations of statistics. Wiley, New York, 1954.
[30] T. Seidenfeld. A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex)
sets of probabilities: Gamma- maximin versus e-admissibility. Synthese,
140(1–2):69–88, 2004.
[31] G. Shafer. A mathematical theory of evidence. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N.J., 1976.
[32] G. Shafer. Constructive probability. Synthese, 48(1):1–60, 1981.
[33] G. Shafer. Savage revisited (with discussion). Statistical Science, 1:463–501,
1986.
[34] G. Shafer. Constructive decision theory. International Journal of Approx-
imate Reasoning, 79:45–62, 2016.
[35] G. Shafer. A mathematical theory of evidence turns 40. International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 79:7–25, 2016.
[36] L. S. Shapley. A value for n-person games. In H. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker,
editors, Contributions to the theory of games, volume 2, pages 307–317.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, US, 1953.
[37] P. Smets. Constructing the pignistic probability function in a context of
uncertainty. In M. Henrion, R. D. Schachter, L. N. Kanal, and J. F. Lem-
mer, editors, Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 5, pages 29–40. North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1990.
[38] P. Smets. Decision making in a context where uncertainty is represented
by belief functions. In R. P. Srivastava and T. J. Mock, editors, Belief
functions in business decisions, pages 17–61. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg,
2002.
[39] P. Smets. Decision making in the TBM: the necessity of the pignistic
transformation. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 38:133–
147, 2005.
[40] P. Smets and R. Kennes. The Transferable Belief Model. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 66:191–243, 1994.
[41] P. Snow. The vulnerability of the transferable belief model to Dutch books.
Artificial Intelligence, 105(1):345–354, 1998.
[42] R. P. Srivastava. Decision making under ambiguity: A belief-function per-
spective. Archives of Control Sciences, 6 (XLII)(1–2):5–27, 1997.
36
[43] T. M. Strat. Decision analysis using belief functions. International Journal
of Approximate Reasoning, 4(5–6):391–417, 1990.
[44] K. Szaniawski. Some remarks concerning the criterion of rational decision
making. Studia Logica, 9(1):221–239, 1960.
[45] M. C. Troffaes. Decision making under uncertainty using imprecise prob-
abilities. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 45(1):17 – 29,
2007.
[46] L. Utkin and T. Augustin. Powerful algorithms for decision making un-
der partial prior information and general ambiguity attitudes. In F. Coz-
man, R. Nau, and T. Seidenfeld, editors, ISIPTA ’05, Proceedings of the
Fourth International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Ap-
plications, pages 349–358, Pittsburgh, PA, 2005. SIPTA.
[47] S. Vineberg. Dutch book arguments. In E. N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford Univer-
sity, spring 2016 edition, 2016. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2016/entries/dutch-book/.
[48] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory Games and Economic Be-
havior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1944.
[49] F. Voorbraak. A computationally efficient approximation of Dempster-
Shafer theory. Int. J. Man-Machine Studies, 30:525–536, 1989.
[50] P. P. Wakker. Dempster belief functions are based on the principle of
complete ignorance. International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and
Knowledge-Based Systems, 08(03):271–284, 2000.
[51] A. Wald. Statistical decision functions which minimize the maximum risk.
The Annals of Mathematics, 46(2):265–280, 1945.
[52] P. Walley. Belief function representations of statistical evidence. The An-
nals of Statistics, 15(4):1439–1465, 1987.
[53] P. Walley. Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. Chapman and
Hall, London, 1991.
[54] L. A. Wasserman. Belief functions and statistical evidence. The Canadian
Journal of Statistics, 18(3):183–196, 1990.
[55] N. Wilson. Decision making with belief functions and pignistic probabil-
ities. In European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches
to Reasoning and Uncertainty, pages 364–371, Granada, November 1993.
Springer Verlag.
[56] W. Xiong and H. Liu. An axiomatic foundation for Yager’s decision theory.
International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 29(4):365–387, 2014.
37
[57] P. Xu, F. Davoine, H. Zha, and T. Denœux. Evidential calibration of
binary SVM classifiers. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning,
72:55–70, 2016.
[58] R. R. Yager. On ordered weighted averaging aggregation operators in multi-
criteria decision making. IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man and Cybernetics,
18:83–190, 1988.
[59] R. R. Yager. Decision making under Dempster-Shafer uncertainties. Inter-
national Journal of General Systems, 20(3):233–245, 1992.
[60] R. R. Yager. Decision making using minimization of regret. International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 36(2):109–128, 2004.
38
